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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
COREY LYNN BROOKS, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Case No. 920853-CA 
Priority No. 15 
STATE'S ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
This answer to defendant Brooks's petition for 
rehearing is filed pursuant to this Court's request dated 
December 7, 1993, and Utah R. App. P. 35. Counsel for the State 
appreciates this Court's grant of an extension of time in which 
to file this answer. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
AND 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The case, and its underlying facts, have been ably set 
forth in the briefs already filed by the parties to this case. 
Those facts will be revisited, as necessary, under the argument 
points of this answering brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Neither the "plain error" nor the "counsel 
ineffectiveness" doctrines apply when no error has been committed 
by the trial court or by counsel. The trial court, with proper 
acquiescence of Brooks's counsel, correctly sentenced Brooks for 
both aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary, separate 
offenses committed during the same criminal episode. The law on 
this point is clear: double jeopardy principles permit such 
sentencing. To avoid unnecessarily duplicative proceedings, this 
Court should amend its opinion to hold that, as a matter of law, 
Brooks was properly sentenced. 
ARGUMENT 
BROOKS WAS CORRECTLY SENTENCED FOR BOTH 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AND AGGRAVATED BURGLARY. 
A. Brooks's Double Jeopardy Argument Fails. 
1. Statutory Analysis. 
Brooks persists in his assertion that either the "plain 
error" or the "counsel ineffectiveness" doctrine permit this 
Court to analyze his double jeopardy-based argument, not raised 
in the trial court, for the first time on appeal. But in this 
case, there was no error, and no defense counsel ineffectiveness, 
involved in sentencing Brooks for both aggravated robbery and 
aggravated burglary. Instead, both sentences were proper. 
Brooks correctly recites the three types of double 
jeopardy protection, construed identically under the federal and 
state constitutions: (1) no second prosecution for the same 
offense after acquittal; (2) no second prosecution for the same 
offense after conviction; and (3) no multiple punishments for the 
same offense. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 
(1969), limited on other grounds, Alabama v. Smith. 490 U.S. 794 
(1989); Brief of Appellant at 23 (Addendum B to Pet. for Reh'g), 
quoting Duran v. Cook, 788 P.2d 1038, 1039 (Utah App. 1990) (in 
turn citing McNair v. Havward, 666 P.2d 321, 323-24 (Utah 1983)). 
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Having been neither previously acquitted nor convicted of the 
charges against him, Brooks invokes the third type of protection: 
he argues that he was illegally subjected to multiple punishments 
for a single offense. 
Brooks's argument relies on an unarticulated premise 
that burglary is a lesser-included offense within the crime of 
robbery.1 That premise is false. The long-established test for 
whether such relationship exists is set forth in Blockburaer v. 
United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932): "[W]here the same act or 
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory 
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are 
two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires 
proof of a fact which the other does not." Id. at 3 04, quoted 
and applied in State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235-36 (Utah 
1990); see also State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 35-36 (Utah 
1987); State v. Sosa, 598 P.2d 342, 345-46 (Utah 1979); Duran, 
788 P.2d at 1040-41 (all utilizing Blockburaer test). 
The phrase "same act or transaction," used in 
Blockburaer, is synonymous with the modern term "single criminal 
episode," in Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1990), part of Utah's 
codification of double jeopardy principles. See Franklin, 735 
P.2d at 35-36 (using the term "same incident" for Blockburaer 
xThe "aggravating" element for aggravated robbery and 
aggravated burglary is quite similar, that is, the possession or 
use of a "dangerous weapon" in the course of the offense. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-6-203, 76-6-302 (1990). Therefore the State, 
like Brooks, analyzes only the simple robbery and simple burglary 
statutes for the purpose of this argument. 
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analysis); State v. Hill. 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983) (using 
"single criminal episode" language for identical analysis under 
Utah Code). The charged robbery and burglary in this case were 
part of a single criminal episode carried out by Brooks. 
Robbery and burglary, as statutorily defined, each 
require proof of a fact that the other does not. Robbery, under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1) (1990), requires proof of "taking of 
personal property" through force or fear. Such "taking" is not 
an element of burglary. Burglary, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
202 (1990), requires proof of "enter[ing] or remain[ing] 
unlawfully in a building." "Entering or remaining" is not an 
element of robbery. Therefore, burglary is not a lesser-included 
offense within robbery, and conviction and punishment for both 
these crimes, even when committed during a single criminal 
episode, is permissible under double jeopardy principles. 
2. Fact-Sensitive Analysis. 
Despite the foregoing statute-based Blockburaer 
analysis, Brooks offers a fact-sensitive argument to support his 
double jeopardy claim.2 He argues that based upon the elements 
of the charged crimes, and the facts that were actually proven at 
trial, his double jeopardy protection has been breached. Brooks 
states: "On the facts of this case, one could not have committed 
2The term "fact-sensitive argument," or "fact-sensitive 
analysis," used in this brief, is the State's shorthand term to 
describe analysis of the facts of the crime as alleged in the 
indictment or information, or, as in this case, analysis of the 
facts that have been actually proven at trial. 
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the robbery without necessarily committing the burglary." Brief 
of Appellant at 25 (Addendum B to Pet. for Reh'g). 
The Utah Supreme Court undertook such fact-sensitive 
double jeopardy analysis in McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1236-37, in 
reliance upon Hill, 674 P.2d at 97: " [T] he greater-lesser 
relationship must be determined by comparing the statutory 
elements of the two crimes as a theoretical matter and, where 
necessary, by reference to the facts proved at trial." However, 
it is very doubtful that such analysis is constitutionally 
required. 
In United States v. Coachman, 727 F.2d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 
1984), the federal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit held that no such analysis is required. To the contrary, 
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 [t]he United States Supreme Court has consistently indicated 
that Blockburger calls for comparison of the statutorily-
prescribed elements of the offenses, not the constituent facts 
either as alleged or proven." 727 F.2d at 1301 (emphasis added) 
(citing Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 694 n.8 (1980); 
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977); and Ianelli v. United 
States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n. 17 (1975)). The Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit, while acknowledging "some conflict" on 
the question, has also held that fact-sensitive double jeopardy 
analysis is not required. United States v. Kimberlin, 781 F.2d 
1247, 1255-57 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. Woodward, 
469 U.S. 105 (1985) (per curiam)), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 938 
5 
(1986). See also Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981) 
(cited in Woodward). 
Therefore, to the extent the Utah Supreme Court, in 
McCovev and Hill, thought that fact-sensitive, case-by-case 
analysis is required under the double jeopardy clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, it was probably mistaken: The Blockburger 
"greater-lesser" analysis of the relevant statutes, by itself, 
probably satisfies double jeopardy concerns, and, by itself, 
defeats Brooks's double jeopardy claim. 
Be that as it may, the State recognizes that this Court 
is not free to overrule the Utah Supreme Court's mistaken 
precedent. This Court can, however, confidently hold that 
Brooks's fact-sensitive argument fails on its own merits. 
While not well-articulated,3 Brooks's argument seems 
to proceed as follows: His entry into Stephanie Vert's home was 
"a voluntary bodily movement," under the definition of "act" 
found in the "General Provisions" section of the Utah Criminal 
Code, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(1) (1990). However, Stephanie 
3For example, Brooks conflates the term "act" with "crime," 
stating that ff[t]he relevant 'act' for purposes of the statute 
and double jeopardy was the armed robbery." Brief of Appellant 
at 24 (Addendum B to Pet. for Reh'g). This is incorrect under 
the statutory definition of "act" upon which Brooks subsequently 
relies. The definition of robbery, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 
(1990) , includes at least two "acts" of "voluntary bodily 
movement[]" or "speech:" a "taking," plus the use of "force or 
fear" to accomplish the taking. Aggravated robbery, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990), contains additional "acts": use of a 
dangerous weapon, or infliction of bodily injury. Further, the 
United States Supreme Court has squarely held that even a single 
physical "act" can constitute two, separately punishable, 
criminal offenses. United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105 
(1985) (per curiam). 
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Vert consented to that particular "act" when she "allowed 
[Brooks] into the residence and began making coffee for them." 
Brief of Appellant at 24 (Addendum B to Pet. for Reh'g). 
Next, the argument goes, merely "remaining" in the Vert 
home, after Brooks wore out his welcome there, was not a 
"voluntary bodily movement," or affirmative "act," under general 
criminal code definitions. Brief of Appellant at 25 (Addendum B 
to Pet. for Reh'g). Therefore, the alternative "enters" or 
"remains" elements of burglary vanish from the picture: the 
former because the entry was by consent, and the latter because 
it requires no affirmative "act." As a result, argues Brooks, on 
the facts of this case the burglary was a lesser-included offense 
within the robbery for double jeopardy purposes. 
Brooks's argument, while creative, does not work. 
Under the specific code provisions dealing with burglary and 
criminal trespass, the burglary element of "enters or remains 
unlawfully" is defined to include any "entry or remaining . . . 
when the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to enter 
or remain on the premises or such portion thereof." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-201 (3) (1990). Under fundamental rules of statutory 
construction, specific code provisions prevail over general ones. 
Accord State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah App. 1990) (citing 
authority). 
Therefore, even though "remaining" in a place does not 
require any affirmative "act" or "bodily movement," it is a 
legitimate element of the crime of burglary. Accord State v. 
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Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985, amended on rehearing 
1988). Thus by merely remaining in the Vert home with the 
requisite criminal intent (to commit robbery or to steal), even 
though he was originally invited into the home, Brooks committed 
burglary. No further "bodily movement" was necessary to complete 
that crime, which is distinct from the crime of robbery, and 
therefore warrants additional punishment. 
Even if Brooks could legally insist upon some further 
"bodily movement" to complete the crime of burglary, such 
insistence would be satisfied in this case. Once his true 
criminal intent was revealed, Brooks did not merely remain in the 
area of the Vert home into which he had been invited. See 
Bradley, 752 P.2d at 876 (consent to entry becomes inoperative 
when scope of entry exceeds implicit scope of consent). Instead, 
he intruded into the bathroom, to handcuff Stephanie Vert to the 
plumbing (R. 453-54). He then rummaged about the home generally, 
seeking items to steal (R. 457). Clearly, these nonconsensual 
"entries" were affirmative "acts" within the general criminal 
definition upon which Brooks erroneously relies. Those "acts" 
completed the crime of burglary, and warrant punishment beyond 
that imposed for robbery alone. 
Finally, Brooks is quite wrong in his assertion that 
"one could not have committed the robbery without necessarily 
committing the burglary" in this case. Brief of Appellant at 25 
(emphasis added; Addendum B to Pet. for Reh'g). Brooks could 
have robbed Stephanie Vert by meeting her someplace other than in 
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her home to rob her; he could have burglarized the Vert home by 
unlawfully entering it when nobody was home. Instead, he both 
robbed Stephanie Vert and unlawfully occupied her home. For 
this, he can justifiably be punished more severely than he could 
if he had committed only aggravated robbery, or only aggravated 
burglary. See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 343 (where distinct statutes 
are directed against "separate evils,11 cumulative punishment is 
appropriate). 
3. It Could Have Been Worse. 
If anything, Brooks should be thankful that the 
consequences of his crimes have not been worse for him. The 
trial court ordered the aggravated burglary and aggravated 
robbery sentences to run concurrently (R. 210-17), although under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1990), it had discretion to impose 
consecutive sentences for those crimes. See State v. Mane, 783 
P.2d 61 (Utah App. 1989) (upholding four consecutive sentences 
for crimes committed during single criminal episode) (citing 
State v. James, 631 P.2d 854 (Utah 1981)). Thus the trial court 
treated Brooks relatively leniently.4 
Further, Brooks has avoided federal prosecution. Under 
18 U.S.C. § 241 (1988), when 
"two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, 
threaten, or intimidate any inhabitant of any 
State, Territory, or District in the free exercise 
or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to 
him by the Constitution or laws of the United 
4This observation also raises the question of what practical 
effect, if any, a double jeopardy ruling in Brooks's favor would 
have upon the time he will actually spend in prison. 
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States . . . They shall be fined not more than 
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or 
both . . . . " 
Brooks had a co-conspirator in his crimes, with whom he 
communicated by walkie-talkie while committing them (R. 455-56). 
Both crimes violated Stephanie Vert's federal rights: the 
robbery deprived her of property without due process of law, U.S. 
Const. Amend. V, and the burglary violated her right to be 
"secure" in her home, U.S. Const. Amend. IV. It therefore 
appears that Brooks could have been federally prosecuted for his 
crimes. See State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 36-38 (1987) 
("separate sovereign" doctrine defeats double jeopardy argument 
against federal and state-imposed punishments). That he was not 
is Brooks's good fortune. 
In sum, petitioner Brooks was properly tried, 
convicted, and sentenced for the separate crimes of aggravated 
robbery and aggravated burglary. There was neither "plain error" 
nor "counsel ineffectiveness" in the failure to address his 
double jeopardy argument in the trial court: that argument fails 
on its merits. 
B. This Court Should Reject Brooks's Argument on the 
Merits, Foreclosing Its Relitigation in the Trial 
Court. 
In its original opinion, this Court properly granted 
Brooks leave to advance his double jeopardy argument in the trial 
court. 225 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15. Instead of doing so, Brooks 
opted to repeat that argument in this Court. He cites State v. 
Babbel, 770 P.2d 987 (Utah 1989), for the proposition that an 
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appellate court, under Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e), can order 
correction of a concededly erroneous sentence, even when such 
error has not been previously identified by the trial court (Pet. 
for Reh'g at 5). 
Brooks's procedural reliance on Babbel is misplaced in 
cases like this one, where no sentencing error has been conceded. 
No such concession is appropriate in this case, because, as 
already set forth, Brooks's double jeopardy-based challenge to 
his sentences fails as a matter of law. 
At this point, then, it would make no sense to leave 
Brooks the option of renewing that challenge (for a third time) 
in the trial court. That challenge would simply fail. 
Therefore, this Court should amend its opinion, to reject 
Brooks's double jeopardy argument on its merits, and to affirm 
the sentences that were imposed upon him for aggravated robbery 
and aggravated burglary. 
CONCLUSION 
Brooks was correctly sentenced for two serious and 
distinct felonies. Those sentences should be affirmed, and this 
Court's opinion should be amended to reflect such affirmance. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1>Q day of December, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General . 
J. KEVIN MURPHY 0 
Assistant Attorney General 
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